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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case is set forth in the Brief of Respondent, p. 1, and 
is incorporated here by reference. This Court granted Goggin leave to file a 
supplemental brief by dated May 14, 2014.1 
1 The Order treated the argument in Goggin's motion as the supplemental 
. The state cites to the motion as Goggin's " 
1 
in her supplemental 
but in that AM-2201, one of the ical 
formulations of synthetic marijuana is a controlled substance is a 
question therefore the jury instructions were fundamentally erroneous 
for not submitting such to the jury (a new issue), the state's evidence was 
insufficient to show that AM-2201 was a controlled substance (supplementing an 
issue raised in the Appellant's brief), and alternatively that she should get a new 
trial to assert a mistake of law defense (also supplementing an issue raised in the 
Appellant's brief). The state characterizes the new issue as: 
4. Has Goggin failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed 
fundamental error in the jury instructions or that she is entitled to an 
acquittal or new trial? 
2 
As AM-2201 Is A Controlled Substance Is A Factual Question 
A. Introduction 
Relying upon the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in ==-,-,--=--::.c=-:t-' 1 
Idaho 972, 318 3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014), Goggin asserts that whether AM-2201 
is a controlled substance is a question of fact, rather than one of law. 
(Supplemental brief, pp. 3-5.) From this premise she extrapolates that it was 
fundamental error for the jury instructions to inform the jury that AM-2201 and 
two other formulations of synthetic marijuana (which Goggin does not dispute are 
controlled substances as a matter of law) are controlled substances as a matter 
of law (supplemental brief, pp. 5-8), that she is entitled to an acquittal based on 
insufficient evidence that AM-2201 is a controlled substance (supplemental brief, 
pp. 8-10); and that she is entitled to a new trial to allow her to submit a mistake of 
law defense to this factual question (supplemental brief, pp. 10-11). This 
argument fails because whether synthetic marijuana containing the formulation 
AM-2201 is a controlled substance is a legal, not a factual question. Even if it 
were a factual question, Goggin has failed to show fundamental error in the jury 
instructions, insufficiency of the evidence, or error in the denial of her motion for 
a new trial to assert a mistake of law defense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of 
over which the free review. State v. Thompson, 1 
3 
796, , 1 1115,1117 =~..:....:.-:=~, 140 Idaho 
P.3d 2004). 
"In sufficiency of we will uphold a judgment of 
conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence 
upon a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, 154 
Idaho 412, 417, 299 P.3d 219, 224 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). The 
appellate court will not substitute its view "as to the credibility of the witnesses, 
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence." State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814,818, 186 P.3d 670, 
674 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 
261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 
P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). 
C. The Question Of Whether Synthetic Marijuana Containing The Specific 
Chemical Formulation AM-2201 Is A Controlled Substance Is A Legal 
Question, Not A Factual One 
"When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of a statute, 
which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. Craven, 154 
Idaho 661, 667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and citation 
omitted). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative history 
and other extrinsic evidence shouid not be consulted for the purpose of altering 
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." 
4 
Regional Medica! Center, 151 Idaho P.3d 502, 506 (2011). 
613 
"not at liberty to d the plain language Code"). An 
is not created merely because "two different interpretations of a statute are 
presented ," a is ambiguous only where the "meaning is so or 
obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." 
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, _, 318 P.3d 
622, 625 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, legislative intent, 
including the analysis of the plain language, "should be derived from a reading of 
the whole act at issue." lsi (quotation and citation omitted). 
Goggin was indicted for delivery of a controlled substance in violation of 
I.C. § 37-2732(a). (R., pp. 490, 494.) That statute provides that "it is unlawful for 
any person to ... deliver ... a controlled substance." I.C. § 37-2732(a). The 
penalty for the crime is defined based on what schedule the drug falls in, with 
delivery of a Schedule I nonnarcotic drug being a felony. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(8). 
Thus, the elements of the crime are delivery of a Schedule I nonnarcotic 
controlled substance. Schedule I, in turn, includes as a hallucinogenic 
(nonnarcotic) controlled sUbstance: 
Tetrahydrocannabinols, or synthetic equivalents of the substances 
contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, 
sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with 
similar chemical structure such as the following: 
i. Tetrahydrocannabinols: 





structurally derived from 
1 H-indol-3-yl-( 1-naphthyl)methane 
atom of the indole ring by 
1-
by 
I C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011).2 The statute also lists dozens (and possibly 
hundreds) specific chemical formulations of synthetic marijuana. I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30)(ii)(b-g) (2011). 
In this case there is no dispute that AM-2201 is a "synthetic substance" 
that mimics marijuana, "such as" the "synthetic drugs" "derived from 3-( -
naphthoyl)indole or 1 H-indol-3-yl-( 1-naphthyl)methane by substitution at the 
nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl." Goggin's only claim is that the actual 
substitution at the indole ring is not by an actual alkyl. (See supplemental brief, 
p. 5 (citing Alley).) The dispute between the testifying chemists was whether the 
presence of a single flourine atom in the carbon chain substitution atom, which all 
acknowledged made the molecule an alkyl halide, was properly classified as an 
alkyl or a halide. (Compare Tr., vol. I, p. 101, L. 12 - p. 102, L. 2; p. 174, L. 19-
p. 176, L. 7 with p. 194, L. 12 - p. 195, L. 7.) Goggin has never claimed that the 
difference between an alkyl and an alkyl halide actually makes AM-2201 
something other than a synthetic marijuana "such as" ones specified. 
The plain language of Schedule I includes synthetic marijuana, regardless 
of minor variations in the chemical formulation. First, the presence of a flourine 
atom in the substitute at the indole ring does not mean that the "substitution" is 
no longer "by alkyl" as that term is used in the statute. Rather, an alkyl halide 
2 The 2011 amendment was in effect at the times relevant to this case. 2011 
Idaho Session Laws, eh. 47, § 1, p. 109. A 2013 amendment is currently in 
effect. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31) (Supp. 2013). 
6 
(such as one a is a of 
R., L. 25, 207, L. 1-
p. 252, L. 20.) chemists (and in this case) as 
an alkyl halide belongs in the alkyl group or the halide group, the question is what 
the legislature . Given the obviously broad intent of the statute, it 
little sense to give the single word "alkyl" its narrowest and most technical 
meaning. The chemical formulation of AM-2201 is specifically covered the 
non-exhaustive chemical formulation list of controlled synthetic marijuana. 
Moreover, the one atom difference, even if the term alkyl halide is not an 
alkyl as that word was used by the legislature, does not change the reality that 
AM-2201 is a formulation of synthetic marijuana "such as" a formulation 
accomplished by sUbstitution by an alkyl. The plain language of the statute is 
clearly a comprehensive ban on synthetic marijuana, rather than a test of specific 
chemical formulations controlled by an exclusive list, and the formula of synthetic 
marijuana known as AM-2201 is therefore a Schedule I controlled sUbstance. 
Goggin's reliance on State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972,318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 
2014), for the proposition that whether the specific chemical formulation of 
synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 is a controlled substance is a factual 
question, is misplaced. In that case the Court of Appeals noted that the parties 
presented "conflicting expert testimony on the meaning of the technical term 
'alkyl.'" kL at _, 318 P.3d at 968. After holding that the word "is 
ambiguous" the Court of Appeals resorted first to "statutory construction" and 
then to the "rule of to interpret this single word of statute. at _, 
7 
18 3d at 968-69. applying the rule of to conclude is one 
be as advocated by Alley did 
"[o]ther portions" of the statute. kL at _, 318 P.3d 970. 
The Court of Appeals then looked at a primary clause of the statute in 
rather than being a comprehensive ban on synthetic 
marijuana, Schedule I created a fact question as to whether a formulation of 
synthetic marijuana one atom different from the "compound structurally derived 
from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or 1 H-indol-3-yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by substitution 
at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl" formulation had "similar chemical 
structure." See ~ at _,318 P.3d at 971-72. 
The flaw in the Court of Appeals' analysis is that it failed to follow the 
mandate that legislative intent "should be derived from a reading of the whole act 
at issue." Farmers Nat. Bank, 155 Idaho at , 318 P.3d at 625. The Court of 
Appeals' divide and conquer approach of starting with a single word, then looking 
at "other portions" of the statute (the main clause of the subsection at issue), 
cannot be reconciled with the requirement that the legislative act should be 
looked at as a whole. When looked at as a whole the only question is whether 
the chemical formulation of AM-2201, which everyone agrees is synthetic 
marijuana, is within the scope of Schedule I. Although there is a dispute as to 
whether the substitution at the indole ring was by alkyl (based on a disagreement 
among chemists as to 
is noth 
the term alkyl includes or excludes alkyl halides), 
that substitution by an alkyl halide rather than alkyl 
means AM-2201 is not a formulation "such as" that listed, and 
8 
scope !. by the language the 
provided specific 
formulations as as the following"). Court of Appeals, by 
analyzing first a single word of the statute contained in the "such as" list, and 
working backwards, made the examples the statute, 
reduced the primary language of the statute to a "catch-all.,,3 
The plain language of this statute shows legislative intent to ban all 
synthetic marijuana, regardless of its chemical formulations. It banned "synthetic 
substances ... such as" the synthetic cannabinoids listed. I.C. § 37 -2705(d)(30). 
The one atom difference identified, even if it took AM-2201 out of the specific list 
of "such as" chemical formulations, did not remove AM-2201 from Schedule I or 
reduce the determination of whether the specific chemical formulation of 
synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 was a controlled substance to a factual 
question. The statute requires a factual determination of only whether Goggin 
delivered (or conspired to deliver, manufacture or possess with intent) synthetic 
marijuana, which is a Schedule I controlled substance. 
Finally, neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative history 
even suggest that the legislature intended that juries decide whether AM-2201 is 
3 The Court of Appeals also applied the "similar chemical structure" language to 
the "synthetic substances" phrase in the statute, even though it modifies the word 
"isomers." Alley, 155 Idaho at _, 318 P.3d at 971 ("Whether AM-2201 has a 
similar chemical structure to one of example substances listed under the 
statute is a question of fact." (emphasis added)). The relevant language is 
"synthetic substances, derivatives, their isomers with similar chemical 
structure such as the following: .... " I C. § 37-2705(c)(30) (2011) (emphasis 
added). 
9 
a Schedule I controlled substance on a 
Appeals reasoned a of federal 
issue have also agreed determining structural is a 
question for the finder of fact." Alley, 155 Idaho at _, 318 P.3d at 971. 
, the Idaho not require a "determin[aiion] [of the] structural 
similarity of chemicals" but instead a determination of whether the product 
delivered is a synthetic marijuana. The portion of the federal Analogue Act cited 
by the Court of Appeals, kL at _ n.5, 318 P.3d at 971 n.5, defines "controlled 
substance analogue" and states it is a substance "the chemical structure of which 
is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance" and 
meets other requirements. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A). The term specifically 
excludes a "controlled substance" from being a "controlled substance analogue." 
§ 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(C)(i). Because the federal statute is fundamentally 
different than the Idaho statute, cases interpreting it are of little utility In 
determining the scope and meaning of Idaho's ban on synthetic marijuana. 
Nor are the cases cited by the Court of Appeals instructive in their 
analysis. In United States v. Bamburg, 478 F.3d 934, 939-41 (8th Cir. 2007), the 
court declined to consider the argument that the mental state element was 
different for "'traditional'" controlled substances than for '''nontraditional' 
such as those covered by the Analogue Act" because any error was necessarily 
harmless; that there was no "plain error" in the jury instruction on witness 
that the trial court's questions of state's expert did not the 
415 1257, 1264 (1 th the 
10 
court noted that after a bench trial, made factual findings the 
were the defense witness lacked expertise, and the 
"proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the chemical structure of 1,4-
butanediol is substantially similar to that of GHB." The appellate court later 
that finding at 1270- In -=..:...:~:::.....::...=::...::.......~...:=...;:...:::..;:..;=, 405 F.3d 
515, 525-27 (th Cir. 2005), the Court stated that "applying the standard 
requirement that a defendant must know the substance in question is a 
'controlled substance' is nonsensical since controlled substance analogues are, 
by definition, not 'controlled substances'" and therefore the proper scienter 
requirement is that the defendant "knew the substance in question was a 
controlled substance analogue.,,4 In United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 123 
n.1 (2d Cir, 2004), the court merely listed the statutory elements of the Analogue 
Act (including that the substance "was similar in structure and effect to a listed 
controlled substance") in the context of a void for vagueness challenge. In 
United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2004), the court noted 
that the argument that it was an "improper delegation of legislative power" to 
have the jury decide whether a substance is "substantially similar" to a controlled 
substance, and therefore an analogue, was only a restatement of the appellant's 
void for vagueness challenge. 
4 This holding, that the defendant had to know the substance he possessed was 
a controlled substance analogue, was rejected by the Fourth Circuit based on 
contrary circuit precedent in United States V. McFadden, F.3d , 2014 WL 
2109374 (4th Cir. 2014). Of course a requirement that Goggin knew that the 
synthetic marijuana was "chemically similar" to listed formulations 
synthetic marijuana would eviscerate the general intent requirements contained 
in Idaho's d 
11 
a 
in the of 




Act. cases, at best, note that the federal definition of analogue requires that 
the be chemically similar to a controlled but not be a 
controlled sUbstance itself, but do not address the issues raised in the present 
case. In short, the federal cases cited by the Court of Appeals are not 
persuasive authority on the interpretation of the Idaho statutes at issue in this 
case. 
The plain language and legislative history of I.C. § 37 -2705(d)(30) both 
show legislative intent to make all synthetic marijuana ("spice") a controlled 
substance. The legislative list of specific chemical formulations of synthetic 
marijuana is merely representative, and not exclusive. Nor is there support in the 
statute for the conclusion that the legislature intended that the formulations 
specifically listed are controlled sUbstances as a matter of law, but that forms of 
synthetic marijuana with slight chemical differences that do not change their 
nature be subject to jury determination on a case-by-case basis whether they are 
controlled or not. Because the statute makes synthetic marijuana, including AM-
2201, a Schedule I controlled substance, the Court of Appeals' decision in 
and Goggin's arguments based thereon, must be rejected. 
12 
Jury Instructions 
For first on appeal, in supplemental , Goggin challenges 
J Instruction 23, wh states: "Under Idaho law synthetic cannabinoids, 
including AM-2201, JVVH-019, and JWH-210 are controlled substances." (R., p. 
886.) Specifically, relying on the analysis in Alley that determination of whether 
the chemical formulation of synthetic marijuana known as AM-2201 is a 
controlled substance is a factual question resolved on a case-by-case basis, 
Goggin argues the court should have submitted that factual question to the jury 
instead of instructed it as a matter of law. (Supplemental brief, pp. 5-6.) 
Because whether AM-2201 is a controlled substance is not a factual question 
resolved on a case-by-case basis, as set forth above, there is no error in the 
instruction. 
Even if the instruction was incorrect, however, Goggin has failed to show 
fundamental error. "It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and 
timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeaL" State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant must 
show that some 
constitutional 
whether the 
or inaction "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived 
plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
in the appellate record, including information as to 






980. resolving a 
a has 
error under the this case. 
The claimed error is not clear. First, at no point, either at tria! or in relation 
to dism did Goggin claim that AM-2201 "similar 
chemical structure" to the synthetic marijuana formulations in the list. It is 
undisputed that AM-2201 is in fact a synthetic marijuana and, at most, only one 
atom different from a formula specifically provided in the statutory list. Goggin 
instead took the position that the list was exclusive, AM-2201 was not on the list, 
and therefore it was not as a matter of law a controlled sUbstance. She had 
nothing to gain from claiming that AM-2201 was a controlled substance if it had 
"similar chemical structure" to the formulas in the list. 
Second, it is far from clear that Alley is a correct statement of the law. 
Prior to Alley there was no real reason to believe the statute made formulas for 
synthetic marijuana on the "such as" list controlled substances as a matter of law 
but formulas not specifically on the list to be decided as questions of fact. Before 
Alley it was not clear that whether AM-2201 is a controlled substance is a factual 
determination made on a case-by-case basis, and until decided by this Court that 
question is still not settled. 
Goggin has also failed to show any prejudice. only evidence in this 
case is that AM-2201 is a "synthetic cannabinoid" that is a "Schedule I 
substance." (Tr., vol. iii, p. 2441, 1 p. 2449, L. 23 - p. 2450, 16; p. 
2453, 17-20; p. 2458, L. 4 - p. 6; p. 2461, 20 - 2462, L. p. 
14 
6-22; p. 2481, L. L. 23, p. 2498, 1 
was no evidence 
could find that AM-2201 is a controlled substance" 8) 
is without basis because at least two witnesses testified that it was. 
In ition, Goggin not dispute that delivery conspiracy 
charges also cover synthetic marijuana with formulations known as JWH-019 and 
JWH-210, which are indisputably synthetic marijuana as a matter of law. Thus, 
any error in lack of a jury determination of whether AM-2201 is also a Schedule I 
controlled substance is necessarily harmless. Goggin argues that she would 
have been able to successfully assert a mistake of fact defense regarding the 
JWH-019 and JWH-210, but for the instruction. (Supplemental brief, pp. 7-8.) 
Such an argument is pure speculation. Although a belief that the substance was 
something that was legal to possess would be a defense, there is no basis for 
claiming that a belief that the substance was a formulation that might be legal if 
the jury does not find it "similar" to other formulations used in synthetic marijuana 
would be a defense. Goggin never claimed, and presented no evidence, that she 
thought the substance was something other than synthetic marijuana. Goggin 
has failed to show a likelihood of a different outcome. 
E. The Evidence Is Sufficient 
Goggin asserts that "the state did not prove that Ms. Goggin knew the 
nature of the material she possessed" and there was "no proof whatsoever 
prove [she] had the intent (knowledge) to commit" a conspiracy to 
or possess with to deliver synthetic 
15 







1 7.) Goggin does not articulate how, even if Alley employed the right analysis 
is a component to determining if 1 is a controlled 
substance, such would render the evidence insufficient. The evidence is that 
Goggin knew exactly what she was dealing in: synthetic marijuana. (See R., pp. 
1002-09.) That she did not know exactly what chemical formulation of synthetic 
marijuana, or thought the particular formula used was not illegal, does not render 
the evidence insufficient. 
F. Goggin Is Not Entitled To A New Trial 
Instruction No. 27 states: "When the evidence shows that a person 
voluntarily did that which the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the 
person did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person believed it to be 
lawful." (R., p. 890.) Goggin asserts that this instruction was rendered incorrect 
by Alley and therefore she is entitled to a new trial. Regardless of whether AM-
2201 is a controlled substance as a matter of fact or a matter of law, ignorance of 
the law is still not a defense to the charges. (See Respondent's brief, pp. 11-17.) 
16 
district court 
DATED this 30th day of May, 201 
Deputy Attorney Gener I 
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